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The military glider has, arguably, enjoyed the
briefest life span of any major military equipment
type - spanning not much more than a decade
and a half from the entry into production of the
first, to the demise of the concept as such. Dur-
ing its heyday, however, the glider was instru-
mental in not a few spectacular operations.
Thus, it is not really surprising that some of the
more iconoclastic military thinkers have, albeit
infrequently, wondered whether there is not still
a place for up to date gliders in modern warfare.
Just over one year ago, Lieutenant McGill Alex-
ander addressed this question in an article in
Militaria, reviewing the glider's primary charac-
teristics and suggesting that these might merit
serious consideration of the glider as a comple-
ment to paratroops. Interestingly, he also
touched on the possibility of employing gliders
in the resupply of fast moving mechanised
forces. This article will outline several other
possible applications of the military glider in the
Southern African context, addressing both low
intensity and conventional war.
Before setting out to do this, it is perhaps as well
to briefly review the glider's salient characteris-
tics. In essence, it has many of the capabilities
of the helicopter which, in fact, largely sup-
planted it. Its disadvantage relative to the heli-
copter is that it allows only for delivery, a differ-
ent means of extraction being required. On the
other hand, the glider can project power to much
greater ranges than even the latest helicopters.
Setting out its salient characteristics in point
form, we have:
• Long range, limited only by the range of avail-
able transport aircraft and air support;
• Extreme accuracy of placement;
• The ability to deliver a concentrated group of
men ready to go into action;
• The ability to deliver heavy equipment;
• The ability to deliver concentrated supply
loads;
• The ability to land on quite rough and very
short unprepared pieces of more or less level
ground;
• Relative imperviousness to local weather con-
ditions;
• Relative expendability resulting from relatively
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low cost and simplicity, the latter also allowing
local development and production.
• Little or no requirement for specialised train-
ing on the part of the troops to be landed,
allowing normal infantry to be so employed
after basic orientation and thereby freeing
paratroops for more specialised tasks.
• A degree of immunity to current air defences,
having no infrared and only - depending on
construction - a low radar signature;
• The ability to deliver a measure of suppres-
sive fire during the landing phase by means
of fixed or flexibly mounted machine guns 1 or
possibly even underwing rocket pools2.
• The possibility of co-inciding the landing
phase with a preparatory air strike, and
• The related ability to land its passengers on
the objective to be assaulted without incurring
unacceptable risks.
Applying these characteristics in the southern
African situation, we can find applications both
in the external element of COIN operations and
in more conventional warfare.
In the former case, one result of our successful
raids against PLAN bases in southern Angola
has been to force their relocation deeper into
that country. The disadvantages of this to PLAN
are readily apparant, but there are also disad-
vantages to ourselves which are less so.
Then, too, we face the situation that distance will
increasingly hamper the employment of heli-
borne assault until the stage is reached where
usefully laden helicopters might well be able to
reach the objective, but would be unable to re-
turn without refuelling. This will then leave us with
rather restricted options:
• An entirely overland raid;
• A paradrop near the objective;
• A heliborne raid relying on refuelling on the
objective or
• A combination of any of the above .
None of these will be without serious disadvan-
tages.
Thus, an overland raid would inevitably be so
well advertised that, far from achieving any
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worthwhile measure of surprise, the raiding force
could very well find itself ambushed and/or cut
off by a superior force. Such a force could not
only be superior in terms of size, but also in
terms of the type of equipment deployed as it
would, in effect, be operating on interior lines.
Also, the further such a raiding force penetrates,
the greater will be its vulnerability to air attack as
the SAAF's ability to provide a continuous CAP
at long range would be limited. At the very best,
such a raid would encounter fully prepared and
alerted defences. Instead of a short, sharp -
almost surgical - strike, we could thus find our-
selves faced with a very messy and potentially
costly imbroglio that would serve only to provide
the enemy with a welcome source of propa-
ganda material.
A paradropped raiding force could well- by dint
of low flying during the approach - achieve a
measure of surprise but would face several other
serious problems. Thus a very low level drop
would go some way towards delaying discovery
but would require extremely accurate navigation
and also carry with it a not inconsiderable risk of
serious injury problems. A more conventional
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drop, on the other hand, would almost certainly
result in the transport aircraft being acquired by
the local air defences, which could prove unac-
ceptably costly. Then, too, the sound of the air-
craft would in either case serve to alert the garri-
son unless the DZ is some distance from the
objective - which would in itself create addi-
tional problems.
Once on the ground, such a raiding force would
be highly vulnerable to any interference at all
until it has successfully consolidated. Even then,
it will remain painfully vulnerable to any mecha-
nised force until and unless at least some heavy
equipment can be dropped. Unless the terrain
and the enemy situation allow low-level extrac-
tion techniques to be employed, this will how-
ever, only be possible after the local air de-
fences have been neutralised. A paradropped
raiding force might well also experience diffi-
culty in overcoming the alerted defences, lack-
ing as it would, any integral heavy support.
Finally, there remains the question of extraction,
although this could probably be quite readily
handled by helicopter - if a sufficiently secure
LZ can be established. This would be of particu-
lar importance if the raid was carried out at
extreme range, as the helicopters might then
have to be refuelled on the ground. In turn, this
presents another set of problems - that of accu-
rate (ie within the LZ) fuel delivery and its hand-
ling on the ground - should the helicopters not
be able to carry sufficient fuel as cargo on the
way to the objective.
The vulnerability of a heliborne raid relying on
refuelling on the objective for its extraction, is
sufficiently apparant not to warrant further dis-
cussion here. Suffice it to say that one major
problem would be the delivery of the fuel in the
absence - which must be assumed in the case
of a large raid - of sufficient helicopters to trans-
port both the raiding force and the necessary
fuel.
While a combination of these approaches would
go a little way towards ameliorating some of
these problems, none would be entirely satisfac-
tory as the essential weaknesses would remain:
the obviousness of a ground force on a long
approach; the extreme vulnerability of unsup-
ported paratroops and the range - and number!
- limitations of helicopters. It is in this context
that the concept of the assault glider would ap-
pear to merit serious consideration as an ele-
ment of cross-border deep-penetration raids.
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A glider-borne deep-penetration raid might,
thus, take the following form:
• An extremely low level approach by the towed
gliders to the release point, thereby seeking to
underfly the opposing surveillance system, a
fighter and/or flak suppression escort being
provided if deemed necessary;
• An equally low approach by seperate and
later starting successive strike and ground
support forces;
• Gliders released some ten minutes from the
objective, using JATO type rocket assistance
to 'pop up' to an altitude from which they can
acquire and reach the objective3, then diving
towards it, the towing aircraft returning to
base at low altitude;
• A preparatory strike on the objective timed to
co-incide with the assault force coming within
earshot of the objective, thereby distracting
the defenders' attention from the sound and
sight of the JATO 'pop up' and, if necessary,
the sound of the towing aircraft.4 This strike
would employ exclusively cluster, fragmenta-
tion (free-fall or rockets), fuel-air or napalm
weapons and cannon fire in order to minimise
the danger of significant terrain-deformation
which could endanger the landing gliders:
• The gliders land on the objective immediately
after the preparatory strike and under cover of
ground support aircraft which, being relatively
manoeuverable at low speeds could continue
to engage the ground defences during the
landing phase. They would use drogue
chutes and/or retro-rockets to reduce their
landing run to a minimum.5
• The assault force disembarks and goes into
action under the continued cover of ground
support aircraft and using whatever heavy
equipment has been brought in in assault or
cargo gliders. This could well include heavy
mortars, light guns and Eland-90s.
• Relieving ground support aircraft stand off,
coming in to deal with indicated targets as the
assault force proceeds to clear the objective
of the enemy.
• Once the assault force has accomplished its
mission, helicopters are brought in to extract
it, refuelling if necessary from fuel carried as
cargo on the run in to the objective or landed
in cargo gliders. The gliders and equipment
too heavy to be lifted out are destroyed and/or
booby trapped. Ground support aircraft cover
the extraction and, together with fighters, es-
cort the returning helicopters. Where sufficient
level ground is available, undamaged gliders
could be picked up by their towing aircraft,
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which would also allow for the extraction of
heavy equipment - such as Eland 90s - and
captured items of interest.6 In the event of an
airfield being available on the objective, ex-
traction would, of course, be still more simpli-
fied.
In the event of a raiding force being intended to
operate in the vicinity of the objective for some
time, both attack and medium helicopters could
be operated from the original objective, being
supplied with fuel and spares by glider or para-
chute as convenient or most practical. The re-
mainder of the force could then be supplied
similarly, with delivery to some elements perhaps
handled by the forward based helicopters. In
such a case, the necessary forward mainte-
nance/repair facilities for all types of equipment
could be provided by flying suitably equipped
cargo gliders into the objective.? Covered and
properly equipped and fitted workshop facilities
could thus be provided, easing the vehicle and
equipment maintenance problem and eliminat-
ing the need for the forward based helicopters to
return to their home base for any but major over-
hauls.
A raid such as that set out above, would naturally
only be justified by a major base or base area
and there is probably a lower limit below which
such a glider-borne raid might no longer be an
efficient approach. This limit will, however, be set
as much by the importance of the particular ob-
jective as by its simple size. Taking a different
approach, a glider-borne raid could well also
recommend itself in the case of an objective that
is within helicopter range but where absolute
surprise is essential. In such a case, a small
raiding party could be inserted by glider, arriving
silently without a preparatory strike but perhaps
enjoying air support once on the objective and
then being speedily extracted by helicopter.
Such an approach might, for instance, be used
where the intention is to seize a particular pris-
oner or item of equipment.
Considering the glider-borne raid in comparison
to the other options outlined earlier, we find that it
offers:
• A greater measure of surprise than any but,
perhaps, a direct heliborne assault;
• Potentially reduced vulnerability by compari-
son with a heliborne or paradropped raiding
force.
• Greater depth then could be achieved by a
purely heliborne assault.
• Considerably less risk of losing irreplaceable
aircraft than either a heliborne assault or a
paradrop: other than the strike and ground
support aircraft - which are at equal risk in
any event - the only aircraft exposed to the air
defences at the objective are the gliders.
These would, in fact, in all probability prove
relatively invulnerable to these air defences -
they would have no infra-red signature to
speak of (the JATO pods would be dropped
well clear of the objective), are silent in their
approach and would be flying a rather unex-
pected profile which would serve to further
confuse anti-aircraft gunners and would in all
probability have a very low radar signature.
Once on the ground, their landing run would
be extremely and thus unexpectedly short
and the retro-rockets would help cover the
disembarkation phase. Then, too, they could
deliver a measure of suppressive fire them-
selves and their landing could be covered by
ground support aircraft (which is somewhat
more difficult to achive in the case of a para-
drop). Finally, the gliders, if not their passen-
gers, would, after all, be expendable. To bring
back a glider is nice, to lose one is accept-
able; to lose a Puma or a C-130 is far from
acceptable.
Summing up, a glider-borne deep-penetration
raid would offer all the advantages of both a
heliborne and a parachute raid while greatly re-
ducing their inherent disadvantages.
Considering a possible conventional assault on
the Republic, this situation, too, would appear to
offer not inconsiderable scope for airborne ope-
rations. In any of these, the employment of gli-
ders could again offer significant advantages
over the more conventional parachute delivery.
In this regard it is perhaps as well to recall that
General Student - in effect the founder of the
German airborne forces - felt that large scale
parachute operations were too costly in lives for
the benefits that they might offer. Another point
that he made very strongly in this regard, is that
the formation of large specialised airborne ele-
ments has a deletrious effect upon the rest of the
army by drawing away too high a proportion of
the best combat personnel. Both of these con-
siderations are, of course, to a large measure
addressed by the glider.
The aim of any conventional assault on the Re-
public would have to be to engage and destroy
our manoeuvre elements, thereby seeking to
create a favourable situation for a revolutionary
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take-over of power by the selected parties. The
realities of force: space ratios and logistic prob-
lems would render any attempt at a more con-
ventional invasion/occupation far too costly for it
to be worthwhile in the foreseeable future. We
would thus not face a 1939/45 style war but
rather something more closely akin to the early
operations by the Boer forces before they al-
lowed themselves to be drawn into static warfare
- in effect columnar warfare of the type that can
also be found much further back in military his-
tory.
In brief, such an assault would seem likely to
take the form of multiple high-speed thrusts by
armoured/mechanised forces towards the vital
Rand area, thereby drawing and engaging our
manoeuvre elements. For the destruction of
these, the attacker would rely on armour superi-
ority and the exploitation of his initiative to
achieve a defeat in detail. These semi-conven-
tional operations would be accompanied by
widespread, thoroughly orchestrated civil dis-
obedience, rioting, sabotage, urban terrorism
and rural guerilla operations. These would serve
not only to distract and hamper us, but also to
prepare the way for a takeover once the conven-
tional phase is completed. In this way, a rela-
tively small attacking force would hope to
achieve its aim and, if not swiftly and imagina-
tively countered, might in fact be able to do so.
Of necessity, the above outline is extremely
sketchy and over-simplified. It should, however,
suffice to set the scene and it certainly does
match with current Soviet doctrine concerning
conventional operations.
Two of the major problems facing such an at-
tacker would result from the sheer size and from
the great distance of the southern African
theatre: an extremely poor force: space ratio and
some extremely long lines of communication. In
combination, these would appear to offer us a
plethora of highly lucrative and vulnerable tar-
gets. Vulnerable because the enemy will hardly
be able to spare many effective combat ele-
ments for rear area security and highly lucrative
because the aforementioned distances will ren-
der him almost uniquely vulnerable to any dis-
ruption of his logistics. This, latter, particularly
also in view of the fact that his force will be
relatively smaal by comparison with our overall
capability, which any delay on his part will facili-
tate our mobilising and concentrating.
For ourselves, it will be essential that we borrow
from what is today Soviet doctrine and imme-
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diately engage the enemy over his entire depth.
Only in this way can we reasonably expect to
balance out his armoured superiority and to im-
pose sufficient friction upon him to allow an ef-
fective overall response. Raiding by ground
forces is likely to be the most effective way of
achieving this aim.
Some such raids could, of course, be carried out
overland by means of small mechanised combat
teams passing into the enemy's rear between his
advancing columns. One possibility that springs
to mind here, would be to employ suitably modi-
fied 'long range' Ratel-20s, 90s and 81 s together
with the appropriate support vehicles. Resupply
during the course of such a raid might well be by
air, where the glider could play a major role.
Over shorter distances, heliborne raids also offer
considerable potential, although many if not
most of our scarce helicopters would in all pro-
bability be fully engaged in supporting the initial
covering-force battles and the later counter-
thrusts. Raids to greater depth would in any
event have to be either parachute or glider in-
serted.
Some possibilities for airborne operations of all
three basic types would include:
During the initial defensive phase:
• The movement of forces of varying sizes to
seize terrain ahead of advancing enemy co-
lumns where time does not allow for overland
movement;
• The seizure of choke points behind the ad-
vancing enemy columns in order to hamper
their resupply and reinforcement;
• Raids against enemy dumps, installations, air-
bases and headquarters;
• The positioning of scouts, observation and
target designation teams in the enemy's rear;
• The insertion of light mobile raiding groups in
the enemy's far rear in order to begin disrup-
tion of his logistics and
• The establishment of temporary airheads in
the enemy's far rear to support and control
raiding groups harrassing his lines of com-
munication.
During the subsequent counter-offensive phase,
possible additional operations might include:
• The seizure of terrain and/or installations vital
to our advance and/or to the enemy's withdra-
wei;
• The establishment of expanding airheads on
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our axes of advance and/or on the enemy's
withdrawel axes;
• The establishment of expanding airheads in
the enemy's far rear and
• The seizure of airfields in the enemy's rear
and the establishment of expanding airheads
on these.
In most of these possible operations, gliders
could offer considerable advantages over para-
chute delivery both during the initial assault or
inseltion and later in the resupply role.
Most importantly, they would allow the employ-
ment of normal infantry and other elements,
thereby freeing fully trained paratroops for more
specialised missions or for operations beyond
helicopter range but where terrain does not allow
the employment of gliders. The use of suitable
gliders could thus greatly expand our potential
for airborne operations and thereby add consi-
derable flexibility to our operations and enhance
our ability to speedily engage the enemy over his
entire depth. The great operational mobility of
gliderborne forces would also allow their deploy-
ment from far to the rear which would serve to
ease our mobilisation problems by freeing for-
ward elements from many raiding tasks.
Naturally, such operations would require varying
degrees of at least temporary local air superiority
if they are to be practicable. In this regard, it
must be remembered that much of the enemy's
air power would, in the opening phase at least,
be fully engaged in counter-air operations and
the support of his own advancing columns. As-
suming that the enemy does not succeed in
gaining air supremacy during this stage, the
situation should, at worst, remain the same dur-
ing our later counter-offensive phase; at best, we
might have full air supremacy. At this poi~t it
might be argued that once we have air suprem-
acy, there would no longer be any need for such
raiding operations. The reply to this is, of course,
that air power alone will not be sufficient - one
need merely consider the German Army's con-
tinued ability to operate in the face of absolute
Allied air supremacy after the 1944 landings or
the October 1973 war.
In any event the application of airborne opera-
tions during a counter-offensive phase would
serve to greatly speed up the enemy's collapse.
Not only would this serve to save lives - and
money! - it might well also serve to preclude the
enemy's backers making good their initial false
assessment by rushing in reinforcements, not
least aircraft.
Most of the possible airborne operations listed
above would be more or less conventional in
execution and there are ample historical ex-
amples of such raids and operations available.
They will, therefore, not be further discussed
here except to once again stress the potential
advantages of gliders in such operations - ad-
vantages that will be apparent from a compari-
son of the glider's characteristics with each indi-
vidual mission's requirements. Two aspects that
do seem to merit further discussion, however,
are the insertion of mobile raiding forces into the
enemy's far rear and the concept of the expan-
ding airhead.
As has been discussed above, one of the major
problems facing a conventional attacker will be
his inordinately long and vulnerable lines of com-
munication. The effect of small mechanised rai-
ding groups roaming the enemy's rear under
these circumstances, can be readily imagined.
Unfortunately, overland penetration into the ene-
my's far rear will not be a practicable proposition
if only because of the time factor - such penetra-
tion would take several days before the force
was far enough in to begin operating; days that
we will not be able to afford. Given suitable ve-
hicles, however, there is no reason why the inser-
tion should not be by air. Vehicles such as the
Eland series or a possible successor family
would seem ideally suited to this role.
While parachute delivery is possible, this would
normally require the transport aircraft to climb to
an altitude where they might all too easily be
acquired by surveillance radars. Low-level ex-
traction techniques might be useable but could
result in unacceptable losses on unprepared
veld. Gliders, on the other hand, would not even
need to 'pop up' as in the raid previously de-
scribed as in this case pinpoint accuracy of
landing would not be required. Considering
southern Africa's topography, there should also
be no shortage of potential landing zones. The
towing aircraft and any escort, could fly low on
both legs of the insertion. Another advantage of
glider delivery would again be that the vehicles
and crews would be guarranteed to arrive to-
gether, which will speed up the reaction to any
unforseen events on the ground. A small path-
finder team might have first to be inserted in a
low-level drop.
Once landed, such small (perhaps around a
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dozen vehicles) raiding groups would set out to
conduct hit and run raids, ambushes and mine-
laying over a large assigned area. Potential tar-
gets would include road convoys, trains, dumps
and installations, communications facilities and
possibly even rearward airfields. For their secu-
rity such forces would rely on:
• Their mobility;
• The small size and low signatures of their
vehicles as well as the difficulty the local
population would have in telling one light ar-
moured vehicle from another;
• The lack of serious opposition;
• The low population density in many of the
likely areas and the lack of effective communi-
cations and
• Most importantly, the simultaneous operations
by several such groups as well as by other
raiding groups closer behind the actual area
of major operations which, together, would
confuse and distract the enemy and hinder
his concentration against anyone of them.
One possible vehicle mix for such a force would
comprise Eland (or successor model) 20s, 90s, a
turretless version fitted with an 81mm mortar and
a few logistic vehicles, probably 1 or 2 tonne
trucks.
As an area becomes untenable or unrewarding,
the raiders could move on or be extracted de-
pending upon the current situation. During the
operation itself, resupply would be by means of
paradrop or glider as is appropriate in each
case. Replacements and replacement vehicles
could be similarly delivered. Final extraction and
the extraction of wounded or sick personnel
would present some difficulties which need not,
however, be unsurmountable. Depending on the
location of the force at the time when extraction
becomes necessary, this might well be possible
by helicopter - additional fuel either being deli-
vered previously or being carried as cargo by
the helicopters on the way in. This would, of
course, entail the abandonment of the vehicles
although critical items of their equipment could
be taken out with the personnel. Casevac might
be similarly handled.
Should a road or other suitable terrain be avail-
able, extraction could be by means of transport
aircraft or landed and recovered gliders. In this
case, the vehicles could, of course, also be re-
covered if sufficient time is available. Casualty
extractions could also be handled by light air-
craft fitted for long range operation and using
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roads or other flat ground to land on. Other
means of extraction could be by sea or by the
raiders moving under their own power overland
and through the area of main operations back to
our own lines. In fact, final extraction might not
be necessary until after the enemy's collapse,
when it would be a fairly peaceful exercise. Apart
from the potential extraction problem, such rai-
ding groups would probably be at less risk than
many of the more conventionally employed units.
Where distance/payload factors might preclude
even the insertion of even light armoured ve-
hicles, armed and suitably equipped Land-rover
type vehicles could be employed in their stead.
These would merely have to be somewhat more
circumspect in their choice of target and means
of engagement.
Suitably orchestrated as a system, the three
types of raiding forces - long range Ratels pene-
trating the combat zone overland and operating
in the enemy's immediate rear, airlanded Eland
type vehicles in his far rear and light vehicles in
his extreme rear - could come close to bringing
about a total collapse of the enemy's zone of
communications. This would seriously slow
down the operations - be it his advance or later
withdrawel - and also force the diversion of
scarce combat elements in an attempt to deal
with the problem. This, in turn, would weaken his
forward forces and could go some way towards
allowing a major thrust by our manoeuvre forces.
A relatively small investment of men and equip-
ment could, therefore, have a major and lasting
effect on the enemy's operations.
A more ambitious approach would be the estab-
lishment of airheads in the enemy's rear as indi-
cated above. Where security considerations
would allow the establishment of these for a
period, they would allow markedly more inten-
sive raiding operations to be conducted. In some
cases, it might even be possible to fly in helicop-
ters to expand the area of operations by ferrying
supplies to the raiding parties or even combat
helicopters to operate in their own right. As it
becomes plain that the enemy is about to put
serious pressure on such an airhead, it could
either be totally extracted - by means similar to
those discussed above - or be relocated to a
safer and/or more fruitful area. In each case the
raiding groups that the airhead has been sup-
porting would operate as independant groups
resupplied directly by air until they, too, are ex-
tracted or move into the area of another - or the
relocated - airhead.
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The airheads envisaged here would not be par-
ticularly large and would ideally be fully mobile,
comprising only the bare minimum of mainte-
nance, medical and command personnel neces-
sary to control and support the raiding opera-
tions in their area. An at least temporarily fixed
one would, of course, have advantages. Thus,
suitably equipped gliders could be flown in to be
used as workshops, dressing stations and com-
munications centres and it could even be pos-
sible to bring in equipment to level an area large
enough to allow powered transport aircraft to
land. The specially fitted gliders would naturally
be extracted and moved with the airhead but
would hardly be worth establishing in an airhead
that moves every day or so. In such a case a
minimum of suitably fitted containers/shelters
might be airlanded during the initial establish-
ment and thereafter moved by the attached heli-
copters or on light trucks as necessary. The
same would apply to other equipment such as
bladder tanks and some essential vehicles, such
as small front-end loader/forklift combinations.
Other vehicles could then move overland.
Security for a new site could initially be provided
by one of the raiding groups until the airhead is
fully established. It might also pay to keep some
armoured vehicles in the immediate vicinity as a
matter of policy in order to assist in the defence
of the airhead should it come under ground at-
tack. Air defence would be provided by light
equipment moving with the airhead. Apart from
Redeye/Strela type weapons, truck mounted
20mm guns could be inserted, as could more
sophisticated types of equipment if available.
The initial establishment of such an airhead
would follow much the same sequence for the
glider-borne raid except that it would not involve
enemy contact. A strike/ground support force
should none the less be on hand as a precaution
unless one or more raiding groups are physically
on the LZ. The latter approach would also elimi-
nate the need for a prior insertion of pathfinders.
Once our manoeuvre forces have gone over to
the counter-offensive, the airhead approach
could be taken a step further by using enemy
airfields as the basic site, after an airborne as-
sault to seize them. Once established, such an
airhead would then even allow for the employ-
ment of fixed wing ground support aircraft
against the enemy's lines of communication.
Strike aircraft might even conceivably be re-
fueled and armed at such an airhead in order to
allow strikes even deeper into the enemy's rear
while remaining based at their home bases for
maintenance purposes. Taking the airhead con-
cept to this extreme would, of course, only be-
come feasible once the enemy is clearly seen to
be at his limit or - alternatively - as a desperate
measure should we be at ours. In the case of all
of the airhead type operations, the risks could be
great but they would also be calculable with a
fair degree of accuracy - the potential rewards
could be well-nigh incalculable. While they
would be possible using conventional parachute
delivery, it would be the use of gliders that would
make such operations really practical proposi-
tions once given the right conditions.
Having put forward several possible employ-
ments of gliders in our defence, it is necessary
also to briefly look at what types of gliders we
might need. In fact, this could be kept down to
two basic types with some of these then being
fitted out for the various specialised applications:
• A small, highly manoeuvreable assault glider
able to transport ten to twelve troops and their
equipment and possibly a small amount of
additional cargo. Ideally, this glider would
have provision for some limited armament in
order to allow it to participate in the suppres-
sion of the defences during an assault land-
ing.
• A larger, cargo glider capable of delivering
between seven and ten tonnes of equipment
including light armoured cars.
Both would need to be sufficiently rugged to
allow recovery where this is allowed by the ter-
rain. Both might also advantageously be so de-
signed as to allow the ready development of
powered versions should these prove desireable
or necessary - in the face of improved enemy
air-surveillance/defences for instance, which
would dictate earlier release. A version of the
cargo glider suited to the delivery of containers
would probably also merit serious consideration.
Other specialised versions could utilize the basic
fuselage, merely incorporating the necessary fit-
tings and equipment.
Totally seperate from these, but meriting consid-
eration, is the possibility of a small powered
glider for surveillance operations, particularly in
couterinsurgency. The basic concept was tried-
a'pparantly with some success, in great part due
to its silence - by the Americans in Vietnam and
it certainly does seem to offer potential in our
case. In the long run, one could also foresee
remotely-piloted versions for various tasks.
Almost certainly there will be not a few readers of
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the above who will be certain by now that the
writer has taken leave of his senses - or perhaps
that he is a 'parabat' who has landed on his head
once too often. The writer believes - hopes? _
that the former is not the case. As regards the
latter, he has grave doubts as to whether any-
thing short of a major disaster would ever per-
suade him to exit an aircraft without the benefit of
boarding stairs! Glider operations he would find
rather more palatable.
Returning to the serious, some of the above sug-
gestions will certainly appear rather wild at first
glance and they will equally certainly bring with
them many problems that the writer has not even
been able to conceive of, before they could be-
come practicable. On the other hand, those who
first suggested dropping troops out of aircraft in
flight with only a small scrap of silk to slow down
their descent, must also have caused some
doubts among their contemporaries as, indeed,
did the initial backers of the glider. Certainly the
one time commander of Eben Emael, should he
still be alive at this time, would be inclined to at
least take a close and serious look at these sug-
gestions before - perhaps - casting them into
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the outer wilds of the circular file. Then, too, he
might find some merit in them.
It is the writer's hope that this will be the spirit in
which they are read - as an initial reconnais-
sance of new ground intended to provoke dis-
cussion, thought, further writing and, perhaps, in
the long run, some action.
'Helmoed-Romer Heitman, SA (Econ)(UCT), B. Soc. Sci.(Hons)(Pub Adm)
(UCT), MA (War studies)(London)
Footnotes
1. As was done with several WW II German gliders. The light DFS 230, for
instance was on occasion fitted with a roof-mounted flexible MG and/or
two fixed MGs in the nose.
2. Although turbulence problems could arise here.
3. Several experiments were conducted successfully during WW II with
various similar methods of extending the gliders autonomous flight time
although this 'pop up' is to the .writers best knowledge, a new approach.
4. The latter will depend on the distance from the objective at which the
gliders can safely be released.
5. In the case of the 9 passenger DFS 230, a combination of drogue chute
and three retro-rockets reduced the landing run to between 14 and 18
Metres.
6. This was carried out repeatedly during WW II by means of the towing
aircraft hooking the suspended - between poles - bridle in a low pass.
7. As was regularly done by the Luftwaffe's tactical and transport units during
WWII.
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